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1. INTRODUCTION
The traditional form of routing provided by the Internet is unicast routing; each
packet sent from a source is delivered to a single receiver. To send the same packet
to multiple sites, a source must send a separate copy of this packet to each receiver.
This results in many identical packets traversing the network links close to the
source. To avoid this waste of bandwidth, a different form of routing, called multi-
cast routing [4], has been developed. Multicast routing creates a directed tree con-
necting the source to all the receivers; when a packet reaches a branch point in the
tree, the router duplicates the packet and then sends a copy over each downstream
link. Thus, a source can reach multiple receivers without sending duplicate copies
of the packet over any link. Because of this increased transmission efficiency, multi-
cast routing will greatly facilitate the transmission of highly popular content such
as live concerts and movies.
Such applications are likely to be significant sources of revenue. However, multi-
casting high quality audio and video to a large population is likely to incur signifi-
cant costs. Unlike the unicast case, the bandwidth used by a multicast transmission
is not directly attributable to a single receiver.4 Thus, one must find a way to dis-
tribute the cost among the various receivers. A cost-sharing mechanism determines
which users receive the multicast transmission and how much they are charged. We
let xi0 denote how much user i is charged and _i denote whether user i receives
the transmission; _i=1 if the user receives the multicast transmission, and _i=0
otherwise.
We consider a particular multicast transmission of, say, a movie and assume that
user i derives utility ui from the movie. A user’s individual welfare, her overall hap-
piness after seeing the movie (or not) and paying the resulting cost, is given by
wi=_iui&xi . The vectors _ and x are functions of the utility vector u; a cost-shar-
ing mechanism is defined by the functions x(u) and _(u). However, the network
does not a priori know the ui , because they are properties of the users, not of the
network; it must rely on the users to report these values. In the applications we are
considering, such as the transmission of a movie, the users are independent and
have little reason to cooperate with each other or with the network. Therefore, we
cannot assume that a user will truthfully report her utility to the network; instead,
we assume that each user is selfish and will report the value that maximizes her
individual welfare wi . The network can discourage such deception by using
strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms in which each user maximizes her welfare by
truthfully revealing ui ; that is, wi (u)wi (u | i vi) for any vi and all i. (Here, (u | i vi) j
=uj , for j{i, and (u | i vi) i=vi .) Strategyproofness is a very strong condition; with
a few additional natural constraints described in Section 2, it leads us to two natural
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4 There are many contexts in which it would be natural for the source to foot the bill (e.g., a sales
presentation) or for the bill to be shared in some fashion between source and receiver (e.g., a telecon-
ference). However, we are restricting our attention here to cases in which the receiver is responsible for
paying for the transmission. This is the most challenging, if perhaps not the most common, case. It may
also be the case most appropriate for mass-market content.
strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms: Marginal Cost (MC) and Shapley Value
(SH) (see [22]).
A cost-sharing mechanism is merely a pair of formulas for x(u) and _(u).
However, computing these quantities is not a trivial task, because the ui (and the
network costs, as we describe in Section 2) are spread throughout the network, and
the results of the computation, the xi (u) and _i (u), must be delivered to the
individual users. Therefore, once given a cost-sharing mechanism, we need to define
the distributed cost-sharing algorithm or protocol that implements that mechanism.
We do not require that the algorithm end with some network router knowing the
results of the entire computation, rather that all users are informed of their
individual allocations xi and _ i . Because these cost-sharing algorithms might deal
with extremely large user populations, it is crucial that they not impose significant
computational and communication burdens on the network. In particular, we care
about how these computational and communication burdens grow with the size of
the user population. If the computational burden on each network router is
reasonable, as it is for the algorithms we discuss, then there is little motivation to
reduce the computational complexity further, because the computing resources of a
router are not fungible. However, there is intense competition for link bandwidth;
thus, minimizing the communication burden of these distributed cost-sharing algo-
rithms is of great interest. In this paper, we focus on the communication burden of
algorithms for implementing the MC and SH cost-sharing mechanisms. We prove
a lower bound suggesting that any cost-sharing algorithm implementing the
Shapley-value mechanism must send a linear number of messages over each of a
linear number of links, a quadratic number of messages overall.5 By contrast, we
give a natural algorithm that implements the marginal-cost mechanism using only
two messages traversing each link (one in each direction).
This paper brings together two separate concerns. The incentive considerations of
strategyproofness restrict the class of cost-sharing mechanisms that can be
employed. Similarly, complexity considerations constrain the set of algorithms that
can be used to implement these mechanisms. One must find mechanisms that both
have the desired incentive properties and also can be feasibly implemented.
Our results suggest that, although both the Shapley-value and marginal-cost
mechanisms have the proper incentive properties (and are, in a well-defined sense
made clear in the next section, the two most appropriate mechanisms for this
problem), only the marginal-cost mechanism can be feasibly implemented.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some
technical preliminaries and a brief discussion of related work. We present our
results on the marginal-cost mechanism in Section 3. Section 5 contains a lower
bound (in a restricted computational model) for algorithms implementing the
Shapley-value mechanism. In our model, we assume that the multicast tree is fixed
and given to us; if, instead, we are given a graph and the task of finding the tree
that optimizes welfare, we show in Section 4 that the welfare value achieved by an
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5 While we focus primarily on message (not bit) complexity, we do, in our lower-bound proof in
Section 5, prevent concatenation of messages and other tricks by requiring that the operations on these
messages be linear.
optimal multicast tree is NP-hard to approximate within any constant. We con-
clude in Section 6 with a brief summary and discussion of open problems.
2. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Network Model
Consider a user population P, a set of network nodes N, and a set of bidirec-
tional network links L. Each user i # P resides6 at some network location : # N. In
this paper, we restrict our attention to a particular multicast flow emanating from
a source located on network node :s # N. The multicast routing infrastructure,
given any set of receivers RP, constructs a tree (the multicast tree) T(R)L
rooted at :s and connecting :s to the nodes at which users in R reside. In general,
the tree T(R) can depend arbitrarily on the subset R, but, for most of this paper
(the exception being Section 4), we shall assume that there is a universal tree T(P)
and that, for each subset RP, the multicast tree T(R) is merely the minimal sub-
tree of T(P) required to reach the elements in R. This assumption implies that the
multicast routing infrastructure chooses, for each user i, a fixed path T(i) from the
source to user i and that, for every set R of receivers, the delivery tree is merely
the union of these fixed paths: T(R)=i # R T(i). This approach of building the
multicast tree out of a nonlooping7 set of unicast paths is relatively simple to
implement and makes the multicast tree quite stable as receivers join and leave;
both of these propertiesease of implementation and stabilityare extremely
important in practice. We adopt this approach for the bulk of our paper, because
it represents the design philosophy embedded in essentially all current multicast
routing proposals (see, for example, [1, 4, 5, 13, 27]). However, this approach does
impose significant limitations on the structure of T(R), because it forces the data
path from the source to a particular user to be independent of which other users
are present; in particular, this approach precludes the use of more theoretically
familiar structures like Steiner trees. The form of multicast routing we consider here
may thus lead to suboptimal trees. We address the possibility of using optimal trees
in Section 4.
Each link l # L has an associated cost c(l )0 that is known by the nodes on each
end. The cost of the tree T(R) reaching a set of receivers R is c(T(R)), and the
overall welfare, or net worth, is NW(R)=uR&c(T(R)), where uR= i # R ui
and c(T(R))=l # T(R) c(l ). Note that the overall welfare is not the sum of the
individual welfares and does not depend on the cost shares. The overall welfare
measures the total benefit of providing the multicast transmission (the sum of the
utilities minus the cost); the cost shares are merely transfers between the receivers
and the network but do not change the overall level of welfare. The fact that
T(R)=i # R T(i) ensures that the cost c(T(R)) is a nondecreasing and submodular
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6 The nodes represent routers, and a user’s being resident at a node means that the node is the
first-hop router for that user.
7 We say that a set of unicast paths is nonlooping if the union of any subset of those paths forms a
tree.
function of the set R: c(T(R+i))c(T(R)) and c(T(R1))+c(T(R2))c(T(R1 _ R2))
+c(T(R1 & R2)), for all R, R1 , R2 P. In Section 4 below, we examine the effect of
dropping the restriction T(R)= i # R T(i).
2.2. Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
Cost-sharing mechanisms are defined by the functions xi (u) and _i (u). For a
given cost-sharing mechanism, define R(u)=[i # P | _i (u)=1], the receiver set, to
be the set of users selected to receive the transmission at a given utility profile u.
Similarly, let W(u)#NW(R(u)) be the welfare resulting from the mechanism at
utility vector u. We consider only strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, and so we
must have wi (u)wi (u | i vi), for all u, i, and vi . We also impose several additional
basic requirements:
v No Positive Transfers (NPT): xi (u)0. This precludes paying receivers to
receive the transmission. We are only considering situations in which the users pay
for the right to participate.
v Voluntary Participation (VP): wi (u)0. Users are always free to not
receive the transmission and not be charged, which would result in an individual
welfare of zero; the network cannot force a user to be worse off than this baseline
option. Note that this implies that xi=0 whenever _i=0, i.e., that the set of users
who pay is a (not necessarily proper) subset of the set who actually receive the
transmission.
v Consumer Sovereignty (CS): For all u, _(u | i vi)=1 for sufficiently large vi .
The cost-sharing algorithm cannot arbitrarily exclude any users; the network has to
allow users to receive the transmission if they are willing to pay a sufficiently high
cost.
There are many strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms that satisfy the above
requirements, some of them quite impractical. For instance, one could send to the
highest bidder (breaking ties arbitrarily), deny all other users, and charge the
chosen user the second highest reported utility; this would result in all users but
one having zero welfare and could result in negative overall welfare if the network
costs were sufficiently high. To exclude such alternatives, we find it useful to con-
sider two other requirements:
v Budget-balance: i # P x i (u)=c(T(R(u))). This requires that the revenue
raised from the receivers cover the cost of the transmission exactly.
v Efficiency: NW(R(u))NW(R), for all RP. This requires that the receiver
set maximize the overall benefit of the network. A set that maximizes NW(R) is
called an efficient set.
It is a classical result in game theory [9, 28] that, in this context, these two
requirements are mutually exclusive; there are no strategyproof cost-sharing
mechanisms that are both budget-balanced and efficient. It is easy to see, and is
shown in [22], that there is essentially only one strategyproof cost-sharing
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mechanism that both satisfies NPT and VP and is efficient: the marginal-cost
mechanism.8 The MC mechanism is a special case of a more general class, the Vickrey
ClarkeGroves [2, 10, 11, 36] mechanisms, and is defined as follows. Let R*(u)
denote the largest efficient set; this is well defined, because submodularity of the cost
function guarantees that the union of two efficient sets is also an efficient set. Let
_i (u)=1, for all i # R*(u), and _i (u)=0, for all i  R*(u); thus, W(u)=NW(R*(u)).
The cost shares are given by
xi=ui _i (u)&(W(u)&W(u | i 0)). (1)
This mechanism gives user i a welfare wi=W(u)&W(u | i 0) that represents the
marginal contribution to the overall welfare provided by her having nonzero utility
for the transmission. Unfortunately, this mechanism is not budget-balanced. It
never runs a budget surplus but can run a budget deficit; in fact, in many cases, it
raises no revenue at all [22].
While the requirement of efficiency picked out a single natural cost-sharing
mechanism, the requirement of budget balance leaves many possible mechanisms.
By imposing the stronger condition of group strategyproofness (no group of users
can increase their welfares by lying about their utilities), one can completely charac-
terize the class of possible cost-sharing mechanisms [21, 22]. Each mechanism
is defined by a function f : 2P [ R |P|0 with the properties that  i fi (R)=c(T(R))
and fi (R+ j) f i (R), for all i, j # P. One can use the function f to define x(u) and
_(u) in an iterative fashion. First, set _ (1)i (u)=1, for all i # P, and R
(1)(u)=P. At
each step k2, let R(k) (u)=[i | _ (k&1)i (u) = 1], x
(k)
i (u) = fi (R
(k) (u)), _ (k)i (u) = 1
if ui  x (k)i (u), and _
(k)
i (u) = 0 if ui<x
(k)
i (u). The sets R
(k) form a monotonic
sequence, R(k)R(k&1), and thus converge after a finite number of steps to some
set R (u); the resulting values for x(u) and _(u) define the cost-sharing mechanism,
and R (u) is the receiver set. The Shapley-value mechanism uses the Shapley value
[31, 35] for the function f; the general definition of the Shapley value [31] applied
to our network cost-sharing problem yields the formula
fi (R)= :
R R&i
|R |!( |R|&|R |&1)!
|R|!
[c(T(R _ i))&c(T(R ))].
This formula is quite forbidding, but it has a simple intuitive explanation: The cost
of a link l is shared equally by all receivers who are downstream of the link.
None of these budget-balanced mechanisms maximizes the overall welfare. Out of
all of them, the Shapley-value mechanism minimizes the worst-case welfare loss;
that is, the quantity Maxu [NW(R*(u))&NW(R(u))] produced by the Shapley-
value mechanism is strictly smaller than the corresponding quantity produced by
other mechanisms in this class [22]. If we insist on budget balance as a require-
ment, it seems natural to choose the mechanism that minimizes the resulting loss
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8 More precisely, all such strategyproof mechanisms are welfare-equivalent to the MC mechanism in
that the resulting individual welfares wi are the same. The only degree of freedom in deviating from the
MC mechanism is that one can exclude users who do not change the overall welfare and whose own
individual welfare is zero.
of efficiency; the Shapley value is thus a natural choice in this class of budget-
balanced cost-sharing mechanisms.
2.3. Computational Model and Costs
For a cost-sharing algorithm to be practical, both communication and local com-
putation should require only modest resources, because cost sharing is not the
raison d ’e^tre of the networkit is done only to support the primary goal of trans-
mitting content to receivers in a financially viable manner. Hence, analyzing the
complexity of algorithms for implementing cost sharing, especially in terms of the
communication burden they impose on the network, is important. By ‘‘communica-
tion burden,’’ we mean messages transmitted over links in L, not local communica-
tion among users resident at the same node. In each round of the algorithm, a node
: # N may receive one message from each of its neighbors in T(P), compute one or
more functions of these messages, values supplied by its resident users, and values
stored in previous rounds, and then send one message to each of its neighbors in
T(P). The resident users may have to execute a local-area network algorithm to
accomplish a round of computation, but the algorithm-design problem this raises
is orthogonal to the problem we consider here, and its communication burden is
taken to be zero.
An instance of a cost-sharing problem has size n+ p+m, where n=|T(P)|,
p=|P|, and m is the total size of the numerical input [c(l )] l # L _ [ui] i # P . Ideally,
the total number of messages sent by a cost-sharing algorithm should be O(n), and
the maximum, over all l # L, of the number of messages sent over l should be O(1).
Note that we care about ‘‘hot spots’’ in bandwidth utilization as well as total
bandwidth utilization; for example, an algorithm in which the total number of
messages is O(n) but 0(n) of the messages ‘‘bunch up’’ on one or a few links is
unsatisfactory.
In this paper, our primary focus is communication, rather than local computa-
tion, but we do not completely disregard local computation. For example, a
mechanism that is NP-hard even to approximate closely is obviously impractical;
it could not be implemented efficiently even if communication costs associated with
the distributed nature of the inputs and outputs were zero and a fortiori cannot be
implemented efficiently if these costs are nonzero, as they are in our model.
Similarly, while we focus primarily on the number of messages that an algorithm
sends, we also require that message size be reasonable. It would not be satisfactory,
for example, to implement a polynomial-time mechanism as follows: Each node,
after receiving a message from each of its children, concatenates all of the received
messages, all of the utilities of players resident at it, and the cost of the link connecting
it to its parent and then sends the result to its parent; when the root :s of T(P) has
received all of the utilities and link costs, it computes _ and x and sends them to its
children so that the needed values can be ‘‘peeled off ’’ as they reach the appropriate
nodes, and the remaining values can be sent further down the tree. This trivial algo-
rithm would achieve the goal of O(1) messages per link, but the maximum size of a
message would be 0(m), which is too big. Message size is not a major issue in this
paper, but we revisit it in context where appropriate in what follows.
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We use the term ‘‘network complexity’’ to capture these four aspects of a cost-
sharing algorithm’s worst-case performance: the local computational complexity,
the total number of messages sent, the maximum number of messages sent over any
one link, and the maximum message size. For an algorithm to be practical, all four
of these burdens must be modest. Because the study of cost-sharing algorithms (and
of algorithmic mechanism design generally) is quite new, we will not give a precise
definition of ‘‘modest;’’ we believe that more examples of prima facie good algo-
rithms than we have at this early stage should inform such a definition. It may turn
out that polynomial-time local computation,9 O(n) messages total, O(1) messages
over any one link, and maximum message size that is polylogarithmic in n and p
and polynomial in the size of the largest c(l ) or ui is the right definition of ‘‘feasible
network complexity.’’ This is achieved by the algorithm in Section 3 below. On the
other hand, there may be mechanism-design problems in which the best that can be
achieved is n } polylog(n) messages total, and this may be acceptable in context. Our
main goal in this paper is to point out that all four aspects of network complexity
are important and that, in our particular problem, there is an algorithm in which
all are acceptable.
We do not address any details of message transmission in this model. We assume
that messages arrive reliably, within a small bounded time, and arrive in order. It
is an open question whether one would obtain fundamentally different network
complexity results for the mechanisms considered here if one assumed an unreliable
network.
2.4. Related Work
This work lies in the intersection of game theory, theoretical computer science,
and networking. Questions of incentives have long been central to game theory, and
there is a vast literature on the mechanism-design or implementation paradigm in
which resource-allocation mechanisms are designed to achieve the socially desirable
outcomes in spite of user selfishness. (See [12] for a review and [26] for an intro-
duction.) Many of these approaches use Nash equilibria (or other notions of non-
cooperative behavior) rather than strategyproofness: That is, they assume that
simultaneous selfish play leads to a self-consistent equilibrium, called a Nash equi-
librium, in which no agent can improve her lot by deviating. The Nash-implementa-
tion approach [3, 19] involves designing resource-allocation mechanisms with
Nash equilibria that yield the socially desirable outcome (such as an efficient andor
budget-balanced andor fair allocation). In contrast, strategyproofness ensures that
no matter how other agents behavewhether selfish, spiteful, or stupidtruthful
revelation is the optimal (dominant) strategy for each user. Strategyproofness is
much more exacting than Nash implementation, and so Nash implementation can
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9 More precisely, each round of local computation at a node : should take time polynomial in the
sizes of its local inputs; these inputs may be supplied by users resident at :, may be received as messages
from neighbors of : in T(P), or may have been computed and stored in previous rounds. The total time
complexity of the computation done at : will obviously also depend on the total number of rounds of
computation done by : during the execution of the whole algorithm; ideally, this number will be O(1),
with each round of computation triggered by a round of incoming messages.
achieve a much wider variety of outcomes. However, [7] argues that strategyproof-
ness may be the only viable approach in the Internet, because one cannot ensure
that simultaneous selfish play will reach the traditionally defined notions of equi-
librium.
There is a long history of applying game-theoretic techniques to networking
problems. Some use incentives as a metaphor for distributed-protocol design (e.g.,
[17]); the elements in the protocol are not selfish, but microeconomic principles
are used to achieve coordination between the elements. Others analyze the impact
of selfish users on current designs (e.g., [14]), determining the resource allocations
achieved at Nash equilibrium. Still others adopt the mechanism-design approach
and modify network designs to cope with user selfishness (e.g., [6, 16, 30, 32, 33]).
There is also significant use of mechanism design in distributed artificial intelligence
(e.g., [29, 34]) and in market-based computation (e.g., [37]).
Despite their increasing role in some of the more applied areas in computer
science, incentives have rarely been an important consideration in traditional
theoretical computer science. Typically, users are assumed either to be cooperative
(i.e., to follow the prescribed algorithm) or to be adversaries who attempt to harm
other users. In contrast, the selfish users of game theory are neither cooperative nor
spiteful; instead they attempt to optimize their own individual welfare. While one
cannot assume selfish users will cooperate, one can assume that they will respond
to incentives. Thus, one need not cope with the worst-case behavior of a byzantive
adversaryonly with predictably selfish behavior.
In short, the game-theoretic literature stresses incentives with (usually) little
regard for network complexity, while the theoretical computer science literature
(usually) focuses on complexity without much consideration of incentives. In one of
the first works to merge these two concerns, Nisan and Ronen [2325] pose non-
cooperative allocation problems such as routing and load balancing and analyze
the computational complexity of the relevant strategyproof mechanisms. Our work
is very much in the same spirit as theirs, except that they consider a centralized set-
ting for the computation, and we address the network complexity in a distributed
setting, for the concrete application of multicast cost sharing. The mechanisms we
consider would not be interesting in Nisan and Ronen’s model. Because their model
allows all of the users to send their data to one node, the receiving node could just
compute SH or MC cost shares, both of which are polynomial-time computable.
SH and MC computations are interesting only when the computational model is
distributed and network complexity matters.
3. MARGINAL-COST MECHANISM
Theorem 3.1. MC cost sharing requires exactly two messages per link. There is
an algorithm that computes the cost shares by performing one bottom-up traversal of
T(P), followed by one top-down traversal, and this algorithm is optimal with respect
to number of messages sent.
Proof. In order to describe the algorithm, we need the following notation. Let
u: denote the sum of the utilities of the users resident at node :, c: the cost of the
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FIG. 1. Bottom-up traversal: Computing welfare values.
link from : to its parent p(:) in the tree T(P), Ch(:) all the child nodes of : in the
tree T(P), V(P) all nodes in the tree T(P), res(:) the set of users at node :, and
T : (P) the union of the subtree rooted at : and the link from : to p(:). With this,
we can compute W: (u), which is the welfare (i.e., utilities minus cost) of T : (P),
as
W: (u)=u:+\ :; # Ch(:) | W ;(u)0 W
; (u)+&c:.
Note that these values can be computed by the bottom-up traversal given in Fig. 1
above.10 Naturally, _(i)=1 (that is, user i is included in the multicast) if W: (u)0
for all nodes : in the path from user i to the root.
Once the W: (u)’s have been computed, the values of the _i (u)’sthat is, the bits
that indicate whether a user i is a member of the efficient set R*(u)can be
propagated in a top-down traversal.
The cost share xi (u) for user i # R*(u), given by Eq. (1), does not require a from-
scratch recomputation of W(u | i 0). For each node : and user i # R*(u) at :, let
yi (u) be the smallest W; (u) of any node ; in the path from : to the root. (This
minimum welfare value might occur at :.) Then there are two cases:
v If ui yi (u), then, without user i, the efficient set is the same as it is with
user i. That is, R*(u)=R*(u | i 0), and the difference W(u)&W(u | i 0) is ui . There-
fore, user i must pay xi (u)#ui&(W(u)&W(u | i 0))=0.
v If, however, ui> yi (u), then dropping user i results in the elimination from
R*(u) of a subtree of total welfare yi (u), and thus user i must pay exactly
xi (u)=ui& yi (u).
To see this, note that dropping user i decreases W: (u) by ui . If ui> yi (u), then
there is some lowest (furthest from the source) ancestor :$ of : for which dropping
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10 Johnson et al. [15] use essentially the same formula in their (independently discovered) strong-
pruning algorithm for the prize-collecting Steiner-tree problem.
user i causes W:$ (u) to become negative and all users resident at nodes in T :$ (P)
to be dropped from the receiver set. Dropping T :$(P) may in turn result in a
negative welfare value for some ancestor :" of :$, which would cause T :" (P) to be
dropped, and so forth. This ‘‘chain reaction’’ stops after the removal of a minimum-
welfare subtree T ; (P). On the other hand, if ui< yi (u), then the tree used to reach
R*(u | i 0) is the same as the one used to reach R*(u).
Observe that this propagation of yi (u) can be combined with the propagation of
_i (u), as shown in Fig. 2 below.
In the top-down traversal given in Fig. 2, we assume that each node : has the
‘‘state’’ from the (earlier) execution of the bottom-up traversal; this consists of the
messages that it received from its children, the message that it sent to its parent,
and the values _i for users i at : (some of which were erroneously, but temporarily,
set to 1 and will be corrected in the top-down traversal). The top-down traversal
has to convey enough information to allow nodes to compute cost shares using
Eq. (1) and to correct erroneous _i values.
Finally, note that two messages must in fact travel over each link in T(P) if cost
shares are to be computed correctly. There are instances in which, for all : # V(P),
cost shares at : depend on utilities at every descendant of : and on utilities andor
link costs between : and the root :s of T(P). In our model, : can only compute
such a share after receiving some information from its parent and each of its
children (although perhaps not as many bits of information as our algorithm
sends). Examples of such instances include those in which R*(u)=P but setting
ui=0 for any i would cause all users in a subtree rooted at some ; # Ch(:s) not to
receive the transmission (because each link joining :s to one of its children has a
very high cost). K
FIG. 2. Top-down traversal: Computing membership bits and cost shares.
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4. WELFARE-MAXIMIZING MULTICAST TREE
The form of routing used in this paper requires that the actual delivery tree be
a subtree of the given universal tree that connects the source to all users. While this
accurately models the current design philosophy of multicast routing, which
emphasizes simplicity and stability over optimization, there are other contexts
involving tree-like delivery structures in which optimality would become the domi-
nant consideration. One such example is that of installing communication lines con-
necting several institutions;11 the situation is static once installed, and thus stability
is not an issue, but minimizing cost can be quite important.
In such settings, it is natural to consider the following generalization of the MC
mechanism. The node set N and link set L form a general digraph; the source :s
is an element of N. Any subtree T of (N, L) that is rooted at :s can be a delivery
tree; because, in this extension, we are identifying nodes with ‘‘players,’’ such a T
defines a receiver set V(T ) and a total welfare value that is just the sum of the
utilities of nodes in T minus the sum of the costs of links in T. The question is
whether, without the restriction used in Section 3 that the delivery tree be a subtree
of the universal T(P), it is computationally feasible to find a delivery tree of maxi-
mum total welfare.
More formally, let T(R) denote the set of all trees connecting the source to a
receiver set R. Given a receiver set R, we choose the tree T # T(R) that minimizes
c(T ); define C(R)=MinT # T(R) c(T ). Then, an efficient set R*N is one that maxi-
mizes uR&C(R). There is no longer a unique largest efficient set, because the
cost function C(R) is not submodular (unlike c(T(R)) in our original problem,
which is submodular). Let W(N, L, c, u, r)=MaxRN&[r](uR&C(R)) be the
optimal efficiency. For a given selection of efficient sets R*(u), Eq. (1) defines the
cost shares for an MC-like strategyproof mechanism satisfying NPT, VP, and CS.
The question is whether we can find a feasible algorithm to implement this
mechanism.
Because computing W( ) is equivalent to the net-worth maximization version
of the Prize-Collecting Steiner-Tree problem [15], it is NP-hard. We now show
that W( ) is NP-hard to approximate within any constant factor, even if (N, L)
is a bounded-degree graph.12 Therefore, the natural generalization of the MC
mechanism that we have defined in this section is apparently computationally
infeasible.
Theorem 4.1. Let G=(N, L) be a digraph, r # N a distinguished root node,
c: L  R0 a cost function on links, and u: N  R0 a utility function on nodes. For
RN&[r], let C(R) be the cost of a minimum-cost tree, the node set of which con-
tains r and R. Then, for any constant =, 0<=<1, the function
W(N, L, c, u, r)= max
RN&[r]
(uR&C(R))
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11 In this context, there is no notion of a ‘‘player’’ that is resident at a node: Each institution
corresponds to a single node, and it has a single utility (or ‘‘prize’’) value; either this node will be
connected to the delivery tree by the routing infrastructure, or it will not be.
12 This easy result had been absent from the extensive literature on this problem.
is NP-hard to approximate13 within ratio =. Moreover, this hardness result holds even
if (N, L) is a bounded-degree digraph.
Proof. Let (x1 , ..., xn , C1 , ..., Cm) be a SAT instance. Assume without loss of
generality that the formula contains a clause (x i 6 x i ), for all 1in.
The equivalent digraph has four levels:
v The first level contains the root r, with utility =3.
v The second level contains a node r$, with utility zero, connected to r via a
link of cost m } K&n&1, where K>>m.
v The third level contains 2n nodes, one for each xi and x i , all with utility
zero, and all connected to r$ via unit-cost links.
v Finally, the fourth level contains m nodes, one for each clause, each of
utility K, and each connected via zero-cost links to the level-3 nodes corresponding
to the literals it contains.
Any digraph of this form has a trivial solution of welfare =3, containing only the
root node r.
To get a solution of welfare greater than =3, we must include the link (r, r$),
which in turn forces the inclusion of all of the level-4 nodes. At most n links from
r$ to level-3 nodes can be included, because n+1 such links would put us back to
welfare =3. For each i, one of the xi -node or the x i -node must be included, in order
to reach the level-4 node corresponding to clause (xi 6 x i ). Therefore, a solution
of welfare greater than =3 corresponds to a satisfying assignment; in fact, such a
solution will have welfare exactly 1+=3.
Unsatisfiable formulas correspond to graphs of maximum welfare =3, on which an
=-approximation algorithm for W( ) would return a value less than or equal to =2.
Satisfiable formulas correspond to graphs of maximum welfare 1+=3, on which an
=-approximation algorithm would return a value greater than or equal to
=(1+=3)>=. Thus =-approximating W( ) is NP-hard.
To obtain a hardness result for bounded-degree graphs, we modify the reduction
as follows. First, replace the 2n links that connect r$ to the level-3 ‘‘literal nodes’’
with a binary tree whose root is r$ and whose leaves are the 2n literal nodes. All
of the nodes in this binary tree have utility zero, and all of the links have cost
zero, except for the links that connect the literal nodes to their parents; each of
these 2n links has cost one. Next, assume without loss of generality that each clause
Cj either is the disjunction of three literals or is of the form (x i 6 x i ). For each
literal y, use a binary tree to connect the literal node corresponding to y to all
of the nodes corresponding to clauses in which y appears. All of the links in these
trees have cost zero, and all of the nodes have utility zero, except for the
‘‘clause nodes’’ themselves, each of which has utility K, as it did in the original
reduction. K
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13 Recall that algorithm A ‘‘approximates f within ratio =, 0<=<1,’’ if, for all x, =A(x) f (x)1=.
5. SHAPLEY-VALUE MECHANISM
SH cost shares can be computed by a brute-force algorithm involving, in the
worst case, the exchange of 3(n } p) messages total and at least p messages over
certain links. We conjecture that this complexity is the best possible and present
some evidence for this below. We first, however, explain the brute-force algo-
rithm.
The simplest case of the SH cost-share problem is the one in which all ui are suf-
ficiently large to guarantee that all of P receives the transmission. (For example,
ui>c(T(P)), for all i, would suffice.) In this case, the SH cost-shares can be com-
puted as follows.14 Do a bottom-up traversal of the tree that determines, for each
node :, the number p: of users in the subtree rooted at :. Then, do a top-down
traversal, which the root initiates by sending the number md=0 to each of its
children. After receiving message md, node : computes
md $#\c(l )p: ++md,
where l is the network link between : and its parent, assigns the cost share md $ to
each of its resident users, and sends md $ to each of its children. Thus, each user
ends up paying a fraction of the cost of each link in its path from the source, where
the fraction is determined by the number of users sharing this link.
To apply the brute-force algorithm to the general case, we must proceed in an
iterative fashion. We initially start, as before, with R=P and compute the cost
shares as above. However, in the general case, we cannot assume that uimd $, for
all i, and so some users may prefer not to receive the transmission. Therefore, after
an iteration, we update R by omitting all users i such that ui<md $ and repeat. The
algorithm terminates when no more users need to be dropped. In the worst case,
one user will be dropped after each iteration, resulting in a total of p iterations and
0(n } p) messages.
Theorem 5.1. The brute-force algorithm implements the SH mechanism with
3(n } p) message exchanges.
We next show a result strongly suggesting that the brute-force algorithm is essen-
tially optimal, i.e., that such quadratic dependence is inherent.
Lower Bound
We prove our lower bound for a particular class of distributed algorithms. These
algorithms start with real variables stored locally at the nodes and proceed by
exchanging messages between nodes, interleaved with local computations. Each
message is a real number, a linear combination of the variables at the sending site
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14 This simple case is essentially a distributed version of the linear-time algorithm given in [20].
and the messages received at the sending site at previous steps.15 If the coefficients
involved in these linear combinations are constant and fixed in advance, then the
algorithm is called an oblivious linear distributed algorithm.
A more general class of algorithms is the one in which the computation of the
next message to be sent from a node is a decision tree with comparisons of linear
combinations of the local variables and the messages received; the leaves of the tree
then compute linear combinations of the local variables and the previously received
messages. We call these the nonoblivious linear distributed algorithms, or simply
linear distributed algorithms, a class that includes all algorithms described in this
paper. In such algorithms, the space of all possible variable values of the initial
variables is subdivided into convex polytopes, and particular values for the constant
coefficients of the linear combinations prevail at each polytope.
We can show the following result, suggesting that, up to constant factors, the
brute-force algorithm is optimal with respect to the number of messages sent:
Theorem 5.2. There is an infinite family of multicast computations, with n nodes
and O(n) users, such that any linear distributed algorithm that implements the SH
mechanism requires in the worst case 0(n2) message exchanges.
Proof. Consider a tree that is a path with nodes :0 through :n . The source is
:0 , the cost of the link [:i , :i+1] is c i+1 , each of the nodes :i , i=1, ..., n&1, has
an agent with utility ui , while there are n agents at :n , with utilities unj , j=1, ..., n.
For reasons of purely notational simplicity, we assume here that the cost ci is
known only by node :i&1 (and not by node :i); this assumption increases the
number of messages that need to be exchanged across each link by at most one. We
shall show that 0(n2) messages are necessary. In particular, we shall show that i
messages must be exchanged across link [:i , :i+1], i=0, ..., n&1.
Consider the last link [:n&1 , :n]. (The general case is very similar and is
explained below.) Suppose that the utilities ui are very large, while all n agents at
:n are excluded one by one at each iteration of the brute-force algorithm. Consider
the task of actually checking that the link costs and the utilities unj fall into this
case. When the unj are in decreasing order, this is tantamount to checking the
inequalities
unj< :
n
i=1
ci
n+ j&i
. (2)
Because we are only interested in the messages across link [:n&1 , :n], we can
regard the network as two nodes, :n and another node : that is formed by merging
all the rest. The variables unj , j=1, ..., n, are local to node :n , while the variables ci ,
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15 Synchronization is, of course, crucial in such algorithms. However, as will soon become apparent,
we shall be interested in distributed algorithms over two sites, in which message exchange can be
assumed to proceed in an orderly alternating fashion. Notice also that we assume that each message is
a real number with no bounds on size, precision, or other computational attributes, in the spirit of
algebraic complexitya framework that excludes encoding tricks but includes all algorithms presented
in this paper and enables our algebraic lower-bounding argument.
i=1, ..., n, are known to the node :. The assertion of the Theorem follows from the
following general result about distributed computation:
Lemma 5.1. Any linear distributed algorithm by two nodes for checking the
inequalities Ax+By>a (assumed to have a feasible solution), where x is an n-vector
known to node I, y is an n-vector known to node II, A, B are n_n nonsingular
matrices known to both, and a is an n-vector known to both, requires n message
exchanges.
Proof of the Lemma. Because we are assuming that linear operations are free
and that the matrices A and B are nonsingular, it is not a loss of generality to
assume that the inequalities to be checked are x< y. It is quite obvious that testing
these inequalities requires n messages; the careful proof follows.
Consider an oblivious distributed algorithm checking this with fewer than n
messages. We shall identify a polytopal subdivision P of R2n as follows: Initially,
P=R2n, and we also set P0=[(x, y) # R2n : x= y]. Whenever a decision of the two
decision trees splits P, we select from among the two pieces of P the one that (a)
has a nonempty intersection with [(x, y) # R2n : x< y] and (b) among those, the
one that contains the highest dimensional piece of P0 . Then the new P0 is defined
as the intersection of the old P0 and the new P. Let P be the polytopal subdivision
at the end of the algorithm.
We call a step in which the dimension of P0 decreases a separation; at a separa-
tion, the dimension of P0 decreases by 1, because an inequality xi< yi was checked,
for some i. If the separation (that is, the test of the decision tree that caused it) hap-
pened at node I, we call it a I-separation, otherwise a II-separation. Let sI and sII
denote the total number of I-separations and II-separations, respectively.
Case 1. Suppose that sI+sII<n. In this case, P contains a nontrivial P0 , and
thus a point with xi= yi , for some i, and hence P is a polytope that contains a
point that satisfies x< y and one that does not. Therefore, it witnesses that the
algorithm is wrong.
Case 2. sI+sIIn. Let mI be the number of messages received by I in this
branch of the algorithm and mII the number received by II. Recall that mI+mII<n.
It follows that either sI>mI or sII>mII ; without loss of generality, assume the
former. Consider the sI steps at which I suffers its separations; at these steps, the
linear tests of I’s decision tree were x^& y^, where x^ and y^ are x and y restricted to sI
indices. Now, these linear forms are linear combinations of x, plus the mI messages
received by I, and these latter messages are linear combinations of x and y, say
Cx+Dy for some mI_n matrices C and D. Thus, x^& y^ can be written as
x^& y^=E(Cx+Dy)+Fx, for some sI_mI matrix E and sI_n matrix F. It follows
from this equation that & y^=EDy, which is impossible, because matrix ED has
rank mI<sI . This contradiction completes the proof. K
We would like to prove two extensions of this lower bound: The first deals with
nonlinear algebraic operations and the second with the case in which the costs ci
are known in advance. The first extension should be provable by exploiting some
algebraic-geometric understanding of the local structure of the high-dimensional
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variety that would now be the analogue of Cx+Dy=b. The second seems to be
true but may require more sophisticated lower-bound techniques.
6. SUMMARY AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper, we considered the problem of sharing the cost of a multicast trans-
mission. We assumed that multicast transmissions incurred per-link network costs
and that the strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms had to satisfy the NPT, CS,
and VP conditions described in Section 2.2. Based on the characterization in [22]
of such mechanisms that are either budget-balanced or efficient, we focused on two
cost-sharing mechanisms: marginal cost and Shapley value. The treatment in [22]
focused solely on the game-theoretic aspects of these two mechanisms, and our goal
here was to determine whether they could be feasibly implemented on a network.
We were thus led to analyze their network complexity, and the apparent gap
between the network complexity of MC and that of SH was the topic of our main
results.
The MC mechanism is implementable with an algorithm that only requires a
single message sent in each direction on each link in the tree T(P). Note that MC
has the following property, which we call ‘‘nonseparability’’: The cost shares of an
agent can depend on those of every other agent with which it shares a link; that is,
for every i, j with T(i) & T( j){<, there is a set [c(l )] l # L of link costs and utility
vectors u and v, uk=vk for all k{ j, such that x i (u){xi (v) or _i (u){_i (v). For
example, the instances described at the end of the proof of Theorem 3.1 illustrate
the nonseparability of MC. Implementing a nonseparable mechanism requires that
at least one message traverse each link in T(P). Our results thus imply that, up to
constant factors, the marginal-cost mechanism, which requires exactly two messages
to traverse each link (one in each direction), is as easy to implement as any
other nonseparable mechanism. Informally, we use the term ‘‘minimal’’ to describe
mechanisms that can be implemented with O(1) messages traversing each link.
By contrast, there is an infinite family of cases in which the SH mechanism
requires (in the limited computational model we considered) a linear number of
messages on a linear number of links. Note that this is roughly the same amount
of communication used by the centralized approach of sending all the ui and cj
values to a designated node, computing the resulting cost shares at that designated
node, and then sending the xi and _i values back to each node. This centralized
approach can be applied to all polynomial-time cost-sharing mechanisms; thus,
at least in the limited computational model we considered, no cost-sharing
mechanisms impose qualitatively higher communication burdens than SH. Infor-
mally, we use the term ‘‘maximal’’ to describe mechanisms that require a linear
number of messages to traverse a linear number of links.
Therefore, the two mechanisms we considered are at the opposite ends of the
feasibility spectrum. Although the purely game-theoretic analysis in [22] gave little
guidance as to which might be more appropriate in practice, the network-com-
plexity analysis here leaves little doubt that only the MC cost-sharing mechanism
is feasible for large user populations. This example suggests that network complexity
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may be an important factor in evaluating candidate cost-sharing mechanisms in
distributed systems.
Our study leaves many open questions. We divide them into four categories.
First, we know very little about minimal and maximal cost-sharing mechanisms
in general. Natural questions include:
v Are all nonseparable budget-balanced mechanisms (satisfying group strategy-
proofness, CS, VP, and NPT) maximal? ‘‘Nonseparability’’ as we have defined it
here is not necessarily the only requirement to consider. One idea we are trying to
capture is that there may be budget-balanced mechanisms that achieve low network
complexity trivially by computing outputs _i (u) and xi (u) for user i that simply
don’t depend on most of the inputs c(l ) and uj , j{i. Some form of ‘‘nontriviality’’
requirement may thus be needed to make the question interesting; ‘‘nonseparability’’
is one form that this requirement can take but not necessarily the only form. In general,
the question is whether the budget-balance requirement leads naturally, with a few
additional restrictions, to the infeasibility of the mechanism.
v Are there any efficient and strategyproof mechanisms besides marginal cost
that are minimal? Recall that MC was essentially the only efficient strategyproof
mechanism satisfying VP and NPT; thus, this question asks whether relaxing the
VP andor NPT requirements would lead to mechanisms that were less easily
implementable than MC.
v What are the game-theoretic properties of strategyproof, minimal mechanisms?
Are there game-theoretic properties that are especially compatible with ease of
implementation?
Second, the current model is, in many ways, unrealistic; we should move beyond
the current model to see which factors significantly change the nature of the results.
For example, it is doubtful that network providers would charge per-link for trans-
missions. While it is not clear what a more realistic charging model would be, it
would be of interest to know how the results here would change as the charging
model changed. In addition, the NPT requirementthat users are not paid for par-
ticipatingdoes not apply to all real-world businesses, particularly e-businesses; as
noted above, we would like to determine the network-complexity properties of cost-
sharing mechanisms that do not have the NPT requirement.
In a similar vein, we can broaden the class of mechanisms considered by address-
ing different goals. Our treatment, following [22], only considered budget-balance
and efficiency as the two natural goals (in addition to our basic requirements of
strategyproofness, CS, VP, and NPT). However, profit maximization is also an
important goal for economic mechanisms. While budget-balance and efficiency are
compatible with strategyproofness, the naive definition of maximal profit is not; all
profit-maximizing mechanisms are equivalent to the one that charges each agent in
the efficient coalition ui and excludes all agents not in the efficient coalition; this is
clearly not strategyproof. The open question is how to define a standard for profit
maximization that is compatible with strategyproofness. Goldberg et al. [8]
address this issue quite elegantly for the case in which there are no costs. Their
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approach does not appear to generalize easily to the case in which users incur dif-
ferent network costs.
Third, one can try to develop a general theory of the network complexity of
mechanism-design problems, as Nisan and Ronen [2325] have done for the cen-
tralized complexity of these problems. It would be useful to be able to prove that
particular mechanisms are ‘‘complete’’ or ‘‘hard’’ for the relevant network com-
plexity classes. This will require formal computational models, appropriate notions
of ‘‘reduction,’’ and other basic ingredients of complexity theory. For all of the
Nash-implementation and strategyproof mechanisms in the literature, one can ask
whether they would be feasibly implementable if the users were on a network. In
this paper, the network setting is intrinsic to the statement of the problem, but there
will doubtless be situations in which agents involved in some other mechanism
interact via the network rather than being centrally located. The question is whether
network complexity is likely to be an important issue for these mechanisms, and that
will depend greatly on the particular setting. One problem domain in which this
might be important is distributed auctions; what class of strategyproof auctions have
low network complexity?
Fourth, and last, we can leave the game-theoretic considerations behind and
focus solely on the network complexity of various distributed functions. Viewing the
ui as general inputs and the xi as general outputs, one can ask which functions
xi (u) can be feasibly computed on a network. In particular, which other functions
xi (u) are minimal, which are maximal, and which are in between?
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